Chilean Competition Law and Policy: The Extraterritorial Transplantation of American Antitrust Law and Chicago School of Economics in the Chilean Context by Bauer, Michael David
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 6 
1-1-2011 
Chilean Competition Law and Policy: The Extraterritorial 
Transplantation of American Antitrust Law and Chicago School of 
Economics in the Chilean Context 
Michael David Bauer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael D. Bauer, Chilean Competition Law and Policy: The Extraterritorial Transplantation of American 
Antitrust Law and Chicago School of Economics in the Chilean Context, 11 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. Law 
(2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol11/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized 






CHILEAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: 
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL TRANSPLANTATION OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST 


































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Michael David Bauer, Juris Doctor Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Editor-in-
Chief, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW.	  





 Competition laws are born and develop from historical necessity and recognition that 
market control by a few dominant firms runs counter to the best interests of the majority.   
Typically, competition policies aim to increase economic welfare by ensuring that prices are 
naturally kept at efficient levels and that firms with dominant positions do not hurt consumers.  
In that pursuit, competition laws act as referees, allowing individual economic actors to 
interact and transact with one another freely and efficiently interrupting only to ensure that 
these players do not break the rules of the game. 
 The Chilean experience provides an interesting example of the introduction and 
development of a competition policy both because of the tumultuous time during which it was 
implemented and the discipline and flexibility with which it was created.  Chile’s first attempt 
at a competition law was a failure both because of the internal weakness of the law and 
because of political resistance to the enforcement of the law itself. Then, during a period of 
military dictatorship,2
 Chile’s experience provides a possible model for other jurisdictions that are 
considering introducing a competition law into their own legal system.  Competition law and 
policy in Chile borrowed certain aspects of the antitrust policy of the United States and was 
 American economists were called to assist Chile in the implementation 
of a workable competition law that has lasted well beyond the end of the dictatorship. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The purpose of this article is not to pass judgment on the methods used by the Pinochet 
government to obtain and maintain political control in Chile during the military dictatorship.  
The human rights violations of the Pinochet government are, of course a cause for concern 
and deserve presentation, discussion, and, ultimately, condemnation.  However, the focus of 
this article is the transplantation and introduction of competent competition policy, and to 
address the human rights concerns associated with the Pinochet dictatorship in a cursory 
fashion would be tangential and inappropriate for this context. 
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the collaborative effort of both Chilean and American economists.  The transplantation of 
American competition law to Chile merits study because of both its successes and its failures, 
and provides valuable perspectives for the responsible transplantation of competition law 
elsewhere. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Part I begins by analyzing, first, the history in 
which the current competition was conceived and, second, the involvement of American 
economists in its development.  Part I concludes by discussing the current law itself, typical 
substantive violations, the adjudicative body and the prosecutorial agency that comprise the 
competition institutions, and the interplay of those organizations and the law in practice.  Part 
II extrapolates the Chilean experience to other possible receiving jurisdictions and explores 
whether the transplantation of competition policy in Chile is a valuable model. 
 
PART I: CHILEAN COMPETITION LAW 
In the American context, the genesis of competition law was the large trusts that were 
formed in the late 19th Century to protect the public from overbearing and dominant firms.  In 
contrast, the Chilean experience required a suitable competition policy for a different reason: 
a tradition of government participation in the economy coupled with a significant unequal 
distribution of income caused by a market dominated by a relatively small minority.  Thus, 
Chile’s historical context produced a unique and important competition law. 
 
A. Early Attempts to Introduce Competition Policy in Chile 
 Chile’s central government took a largely laissez-faire approach to the regulation of its 
economy, pursuing relatively few policies to exact control over the market in a meaningful 
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way until the 1930s.3  However, because its economy was largely dependent on foreign 
capital from trade, when the Great Depression caused economic turmoil abroad and, as a 
result, significant reductions in foreign investment of capital, Chile’s economic output 
predictably shrank.4  The Chilean legislature responded by redirecting the country’s economic 
legislation toward state participation to minimize the effect of the Depression.5  To that end, 
the government enacted price and wage controls to temporarily stimulate demand and curtail 
further depression.6
 Thus, the role of the government with respect to the economy changed significantly in 
response to the economic difficulties presented by the Great Depression.  The government 
became “the promoter of business activity in the private sector, as a major propellant of the 
industrialization process, and as an important economic agent in its own right.”
   
7  Indeed, the 
government became a producer itself by creating price and wage controls to manage and 
create market demand, which in turn created significant barriers to the formation of new 
businesses to support existing ones.8  The shift to more government control took Chilean 
markets from existence within a laissez-faire state to depending on capital from a government 
that acted as a guarantor of market demand.9
 While some believed that the legislature was “forging a new permanent public 
economic order” when it enacted these new economic policies, the legislation was intended to 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




7	  JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS, PINOCHET’S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN CHILE, 8 
(Cambridge University Press 1995).	  
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 59. 
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act as a short-term fix to the present economic problems caused by the depressed economy.10  
By the 1950s, however, these “temporary” fixes had developed a permanent character and 
appeared to be a lasting fixture in Chilean economic legislation.11  Unfortunately, the 
economic policy proved unable to curb the inflation caused by the Depression.12  Still, the 
government was committed to expansionary policies through the early 1950s.13
 The government did attempt to take alternative steps to try to resolve the lack of 
economic recovery.  In 1955, President Carlos Ibáñez’s government hired the American firm 
Klein-Saks to analyze the economic situation and make recommendations as to how to 
improve the Chilean economy.
 
14  Klein-Saks noted that “price controls were impossible and 
skewed the Chilean economy badly where they did have an effect.”15  The firm recommended 
that the central government adopt a free-market approach and enact an anti-monopoly regime 
as a policing agent.16  However, the suggestions were ignored because of political pressure, 
and, in many instances, the government acted against the advice of the firm.17
 Then, in 1958, newly-elected president Jorge Alessandri espoused an ideology that 
focused on  disengaging  the government from economic activity.
 
18
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Furnish, supra note 2, at 464.   
  Alessandri gained 
political prominence for his opposition to the Radical party, which had been in power from 
1938 to 1952 and whose economic policy of expanding government participation had created 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 465. 
13 See VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 105. 




18 VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 104. 
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significant inflation.19  When Alessandri took office, inflation was over 30 percent per year.20  
In response, Alessandri proposed encouraging free-market competition and reducing price and 
wage controls.21  The plan would allow the deregulated, competitive markets to “control” 
prices and keep them at naturally efficient levels without the need for state intervention.22  
Where the Klein-Saks suggestions had failed, this was now politically feasible for two 
reasons: first, the public generally supported any program that could end inflation; and 
second, Alessandri suggested these changes as additions to the existing law, rather than 
measures that would entirely supplant it.23
 Alessandri’s government introduced the competitive market regime with Ley no. 
13,305.  This law disallowed the state from making concessions that would create a 
monopoly
 
24 and prohibited any agreements that had the effect of impeding competition.25  
However, monopolies were permitted where created by law,26 and the president could 
authorize conduct that was otherwise illegal.27  The law created an Anti-Monopolies 
Commission to adjudicate claims of anticompetitive behavior.28  The Commission could order 
injunctive or monetary-damage relief or refer the case to the criminal court.29
 During its first few years of existence, the Commission was relatively aggressive in 
the application of the law; however, by 1964, the Commission had slowed to hearing less than 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




23 Id. at 466-67. 
24 Ley no. 13,305, art. 172. 
25 Ley no. 13,305, art. 173. 
26 Ley no. 13,305, art. 172. 
27 Ley no. 13,305, art. 174. 
28 Ley no. 13,305, art. 182. 
29 Furnish, supra note 2, at 470. 
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half a dozen cases per year.30  More importantly, as a matter of policy, the Commission and 
the Chilean Supreme Court resisted using the law to change the tradition of state intervention 
in and control of the economy,31 which was possible because the law specifically allowed for 
the continued control of “economic and industrial activities.”32
 Thus, the government continued to act as a propellant and guarantor of demand in the 
Chilean economy by infusing the industrial sector with public funds.  However, because of 
the significant inflation that continued during the time and because the Chilean industrial 
sector was controlled by a small minority of the population, such intervention generally 
tended to worsen the already problematic wealth gap in Chile.
  Therefore, because the law 
was internally weakened by its own provisions, it was ineffective in practice and failed to 
facilitate a more efficient economy. 
33
B. The Legal Route to Socialism and Ensuing Unrest in Chile 
  Where Alessandri’s free-
market approach had seemingly failed in Chile, socialism offered a plausibly acceptable 
alternative to try to remedy the impermissibly inequitable state of the Chilean economy.   
 In 1970, newly-elected president Salvador Allende claimed that his election 
represented a “legal route to socialism” in Chile.34  Allende intended his government to be 
“anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchical, and anti-monopolistic.”35
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. at 471. 
  Although politically opposed to 
private monopolistic control of industries, the Allende government nationalized productive 
sectors of the economy, expropriated large amounts of land, and enacted significant price 
31 Id. at 481. 
32 Ley no. 13,305, art. 181. 
33 See VALDÉS, supra note 6,at 7–9.   
34  Id. at 1. 
35 Id. at 6. 
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control.36  The goal was to restructure an economy in which a few dominant firms controlled 
the market at the expense of the majority of the population.37
 Within Chile, Allende’s policy generated almost immediate hostility from right-wing 
elements of Chilean politics, not only because the changes negatively affected the leaders of 
Chile’s industrial sector, but also because the economy continued to deteriorate while 
inflation soared.
  This legal restructuring 
solidified the state’s role in the economy. 
38  The Chilean periodical El Mercurio urged that,  to modernize Chile, it was 
essential to move away from state-controlled economy towards a market economy.39  
Although Chile had previously enjoyed political stability unique to most of Latin America 
discussions of military intervention against the socialist government took on a serious and 
threatening character not long after Allende’s election.40
 Outside of Chile, it appeared that the election of Allende firmly established Chile as a 
socialist country.  In other Latin American countries, Chile became known as the “fatherland 
of the state” because of its commitment to heavy government participation in the economy.
 
41  
Chile seemed to be eternally committed to price controls and state participation.42
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Id. at 7. 
  In an 
article published in 1971 on the state of Chilean antitrust law and policy under President 
Allende , an American law professor argued that competition laws failed in Chile because of 
the nation’s long-term commitment to bureaucratic control and state intervention in the 
37 See id. at 7–9. 
38 Id. at 249. 
39 Id. at 29 (citing El Mecurio, “La Semana Política,” 23 July 1980).   
40 Id. at 242. 
41 Id. at 100. 
42 Furnish, supra note 2, at 487.   
 
	   9	  
economic affairs of the country.43  The professor concluded the article by declaring: 
“Antitrust plays almost no part in regulating the Chilean economy today.  Barring an unlikely 
turn of events under the present or some future administration, antitrust will never be an 
important law in Chile…”44
 Two years after the publication of that article, General Augusto Pinochet led a military 
coup to overthrow the socialist government and establish a military dictatorship that would 
dismantle the state’s role in the economy and liberalize the Chilean markets.
 
45  While the past 
four decades were characterized by a government obsessed with controlling the economy in 
an attempt to create a just economy in Chile, the Pinochet government was willing to 
disregard the ethical and social repercussions of the indiscriminate liberalization of the 
economy.46  In the same way that Allende’s government intended to radically change the 
essential character of the Chilean government into an entirely socialist state, Pinochet 
similarly sought to drastically restructure the Chilean political structure to dismember the 
socialist state.47
C. Modern Chilean Competition Law 
 
(1) The Chicago School of Economics 
 In the 1950s, a group of economists in the University of Chicago’s Economics 
Department began developing a school of thought that abandoned Keynesian faith in the 
necessity of government participation in the market and embraced market-oriented 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 485. 
45 VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 7.   
46 See id. at 259. 
47 See id. at 8. 
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economics.48 Known as the Chicago School of Economics,49 this neo-liberal approach 
assumed that markets were capable of self-correction and the elimination of dominant market 
positions without the need for most government intervention.50  These economists rejected the 
notion that the government was the engine through which the economy would grow in favor 
of viewing the market as the basis for free and efficient economic exchange between 
individuals.51  They advocated a Pareto-efficient economy52 through the un-coerced actions of 
rational, optimizing individual actors.53
 Thus, a significant concern for the Chicago School was the appropriate role of the 
government in the economic affairs of the country.  In the Chicago School’s view, rather than 
acting as a participant, the government should limit itself to establishing the rules that govern 
the transactions and production activities of the individual actors and to enforcing those rules 
as an external actor to the transaction.
   
54
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  id.	  at	  60.	  
  In pursuit of that end, the government should refrain 
both from behaving as a competitor with the ability to act without concern for the 
competitiveness of its operations, as well as from supporting firms that proved to be too 
inefficient to survive on their own.  The Chicago School also advocated a more limited 
capacity for the government with respect to price and wage controls: instead of enacting such 
49 See id. 
50 DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION, 142 
(Oxford University Press 2010).  
51 VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 67. 
52 An economy is Pareto efficient where an individual can, through his individual economic 
transactions, make himself better off without making any other individual actor worse off than 
before the transaction.  The presumption is that state intervention distorts individual 
preferences, and the costs and inefficiencies associated with government participation in the 
market make “optimal” choices impossible.  Instead, the individual actor should be free from 
any coercion or authority that does not come from the rational desire to maximize utility. 
53 VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 68. 
54 Id. at 69. 
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rigid price control, the government should allow the newly liberalized market to set its own 
efficient prices.55
 With respect to competition laws, the Chicago School campaigned for a policy that 
would be predicated on neo-classical economic theory that deters pro-competitive conduct.
  The Chicago School placed its faith not in the salvation of state spending, 
but rather entirely in the self-correcting capacity of the market.   
56  
This approach placed an emphasis on improving economic efficiency and increasing 
consumer welfare and defined anti-competitive behavior as conduct that increased market 
prices above the competitive price.57
 In the 1950s, the Chicago School economists saw in Latin America a nearby 
laboratory in which they could test their developing theories and gather empirical research.
  While earlier conceptualizations of competition policy 
in the United States primarily relied on concerns for equity to justify the law, the primary 
concern now shifted to economically inefficient increases in market price.   
58  
The University of Chicago entered into a contract with the Universidad Católica de Chile 
through which the University of Chicago would establish a school of economics at the 
Universidad Católica.59  The university setting would allow the Chicago School economists to 
implant their market-oriented ideology.60  The University of Chicago sent a group of 
economists, who came to be known as the “Chicago Boys,” to Chile to teach and train new 
economists.61
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Id. at 21. 
  By the time that the Pinochet dictatorship began, Chicago School economics 
56 GERBER, supra note 49, at 143. 
57 Id. 
58 VALDÉS, supra note 6, at 93 . 
59 Id. at 127. 
60 Id. at 162. 
61 Id. 
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had become the pervasive theory at the Universidad Católica.62
 Part of the goal of the Chicago School’s endeavor into developing economies was the 
desire to increase social freedoms through economic liberalization.  According to the Chicago 
School, “[f]or the preservation of personal freedom it is essential to have a large sector of 
economic life organized privately and competitively.”
  Thus, when Pinochet seized 
power in Chile with the stated purpose of reducing state presence in the economy, the 
Chicago School economists were poised to wage their ideological battle against Keynesian 
economics in the broader Chilean context outside of the Universidad.   
63  Given the nature of Pinochet’s 
government, it is ironic that the avenues chosen to pursue the lofty goal of freedom were 
paved during a brutal military dictatorship.  Pinochet’s disregard for the manner in which 
economic liberalization occurred gave the Chicago School economists the opportunity to 
transplant their neo-liberal economic ideology into a viable testing ground in a country with 
decades of strong state presence.64
 Thus, while Pinochet’s government demanded that the economy be liberalized, the 
Chicago Boys had discretion to determine the manner in which they approached the 
liberalization process.  Upon the Chicago Boys’ suggestion, price controls were removed; 
large firms that had been controlled by the government were privatized; international tariffs 
were reduced; and other barriers to trade were eliminated.
 
65  No longer would the government 
act as producer66 or as guarantor of the industrial sectors of the economy.67
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Id. at 252. 
 Instead, the 
government would be limited to regulating the economy and would play a supportive role 
63 Id. at 56.   
64 See id. at 127. 
65 Id. at 22. 
66 Id. at 23. 
67 Id. at 24. 
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only to aid those in extreme poverty.68
(2) The Competition Law 
  Chile’s current competition law, the Law in Defense 
of Free Competition, was part of this economic reorganization.  
 Chile enacted the Law in Defense of Free Competition in 1973 to promote and defend 
free market competition in Chile.69  Aside from stating the broad policy goals of the law, 
Article 170 contains a broad prohibition that criminalizes acts or agreements that are against 
free competition in economic activities.71  This ban applies to all individuals, regardless of 
any percentage of state ownership.72
 Article 3 delineates anticompetitive practices.
  
73
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id. 
  Originally, these categories were 
considered to be per se violations based upon the assumption that there was such a low 
likelihood that “anticompetitive” practices could have pro-competitive benefits that it was 
69 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. I.   
70 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. I (“The object of this law is the promotion and 
defense of free competition in the markets.  Those who act against free competition in 
economic activities will be corrected, prohibited, or reprimanded according to the provisions 
of this law”) (translated from Spanish by the author). 
71 Id.; TERRY WINSLOW, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN CHILE: A PEER REVIEW, 31 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Competition Division 2004). 
72 Id. at 33. 
73 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. 3 reads: “Anyone who makes or enters into, 
either individually or collectively, any act or agreement that impedes, restricts or damages 
free competition, or that tends to produce such effects, will be sanctioned according to the 
Article 26 of this law, with detracting from the preventative, corrective or prohibitive 
measures that could be applied to each case.  Such acts include: 
(a) Express or tacit agreements among competitors, or arranged or agreed upon 
practices between them, that grants them market power and that consists of fixing 
prices, limiting production, assigning market zones or quotas, excluding 
competitors, or affecting the results of tender offers.	  
(b) The abusive exploitation by a firm, or group of firms, with a dominant market 
position, though fixing prices, tying arrangements, assigning market zones or 
quotas, or imposing other similar abuses.	  
(c) Predatory practices, or unfair competition, that seeks to establish, maintain or 
augment a dominant market position” (translated from Spanish by the author). 
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better to ban such practices entirely.74  Now, the enumerated activities listed in Article 3 are 
interpreted to be a guide for conduct that tends to be anticompetitive but still requires 
additional economic analysis to show actual negative effects.75  With its reference to Article 
26 of the Act, Article 3 also grants the adjudicative tribunal for competition-law violations the 
power to modify or terminate violative acts or agreements, order the modification or 
dissolution of violative corporations or companies, and issue fines, where it has been found 
that an activity falls into one of the enumerated categories and has an anticompetitive effect.76  
Similarly, Article 4 outlaws monopolies, except where otherwise authorized by law.77
(3) Substantive Violations of the Competition Law 
 
 
 Much like its American equivalent, Chile’s Law in Defense of Free Competition is a 
broad law that generally bans acts and agreements that restrain or attempt to restrain free 
competition.78
 
  Chile is a civil law jurisdiction, so its precedent is not binding in the way that 
common law jurisdictions are bound by prior rulings.  However, Chile has been able to 
develop some jurisprudence regarding typical competition-law substantive issues. 
(a) Horizontal Agreements A horizontal agreement is an agreement among competitors, 
often called a cartel.79
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 WINSLOW, supra note 70, at 32. 
  There have been relatively few challenges alleging the actual existence 
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76 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. 3, 26. 
77 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. 4 (“It is impossible to grant concessions, 
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economic activities, unless the law so authorizes”) (translated from Spanish by the author). 
78 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title I, Art. 1. 
79 GERBER, supra note 49, at 129. 
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of a cartel because its existence is hard to investigate and prove.80  Moreover, given the 
relatively small size of the Chilean economy, a “small business elite may be able to restrict 
output and increase price through tacit collusion,” rather than via express, well-documented 
agreements.81  The prosecutorial agency’s solution to the clandestine nature of cartelization is 
to prove price fixing by surveying prices and demonstrating that no other plausible reason for 
price uniformity exists, save collusive agreement.82
(b) Vertical Agreements 
   
 By contrast, a vertical agreement is an agreement between firms at different levels of 
the distribution chain.83  The Chilean government has devoted significantly more resources to 
the prosecution of anticompetitive behavior based on vertical agreements than on horizontal 
agreements.84  Vertical agreements were prevalent among the early cases in Chile prosecuted 
as per se violations of the competition law.85  Now, however, vertical restraints and price 
discrimination are evaluated to determine whether they have efficiency justifications, and 
typically are not found to be anticompetitive where the firm imposing the restrictions does not 
have market power.86
(c) Abuse of Dominance 
 
 Called monopolization in the United States, abuse-of-dominance violations arise 
where one firm has the ability to harm consumers and inhibit competition by setting prices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 WINSLOW, supra note 70, at 38. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 




	   16	  
below cost to drive out competitor firms and then raising prices above the competitive price.87  
In the United States, firms that abused their dominant positions engendered some of the 
original support for the United States’ competition law.88  Similarly, given state ownership 
and control of many important Chilean industries, abuse of dominance became the focus of 
the enforcement of the competition law upon its enactment.89
 While there have been a large number of abuse of dominance cases, they tend to deal 
only with the infrastructure industry, like telecommunications.
   
90  This could be due to the lack 
of formal and informal guidelines regarding market definition and dominance assessment.91
 
  
Thus, to expand and mature the role of the abuse of dominance concept in the deterrence of 
anticompetitive behavior, it will be necessary for the adjudicative body to more accurately 
and succinctly define these terms for the prosecutorial agency. 
(d) Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Mergers and acquisitions are the combining of corporate entities that cause high levels 
of economic concentration and can create significant potential for the restraint of 
competition.92  While Chile originally had difficulty controlling mergers, this area has 
become increasingly important in the prosecution of anticompetitive behavior in Chile.93
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  The 
adjudicative body has actively sought to prevent mergers that would deter the development of 
88 Id. at 130. 
89 WINSLOW, supra note 70, at 42. 
90 Id. at 43. 
91 Id. 
92 See GERBER, supra note 49, at 131. 
93 WINSLOW, supra note 70, at 44. 
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competition.94  Though the law previously lacked a requirement that merging parties notify 
the government, amendments have established procedures requiring the presentation of 
information about the merger and its possible consequences for competition to the 
prosecutorial agency.95
(e) Unfair Competition  
 
 Finally, the competition law does not explicitly enumerate unfair competition as a 
violation, but the adjudicative body has found that Article 1 is broad enough to include unfair 
competition.96  Unfair competition claims typically involve private disputes, and it has been 
suggested the competition institution is not the appropriate forum for these debates.97  Still, it 
is in the aggregate that unfair competition is found to be anticompetitive, such that it 
undermines confidence in the market’s integrity, distorts market information available to 
consumers, and affects purchase decisions.98
(3) The Adjudicative Body and the Prosecutorial Agency 
  But the appropriate venue for the adjudication 
of private claims that have competition objectives is probably not the court that oversees 
violations of the competition law. 
 Originally, Title II provided for two separate adjudicative bodies: the Comisión 
Resulativa (“Resolving Commission”) and the Comisión Preventativa (“Preventative 
Commission”).  The Resolving Commission was a special court whose main function was to 
resolve cases brought either by individual complainants or by the prosecutorial body-the 
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Fiscalía.99  The Preventative Commission was a “consultative organ” to which individuals, 
firms, and government entities could submit questions regarding whether given activities were 
violative of the competition law.100
 The Tribunal is now the sole adjudicative authority that “prevents, corrects and 
sanctions anticompetitive behavior.”
  Now, both adversarial claims, in which there is a live 
controversy, and cases brought for non-adversarial advisory declarations are presented to the 
same court: the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (“Competition Tribunal”).   
101  The new adjudicative body still has the power to 
issue non-adversarial declarations and to suggest changes to the competition laws when it 
thinks that they are adverse to fostering competition.102  The verdicts issued by the Tribunal 
can be appealed to the Supreme Court.103  Unfortunately, the economic analysis presented to 
and used by the Tribunal is generally of poor quality and it “is seldom the case that claims are 
supported by rigorous conceptual analysis.”104
 The Fiscalía Nacional Económica (“National Economic Prosecutor’s Office”) is the 
prosecutorial body that investigates the markets for anticompetitive behavior and brings suit 
for violations of the competition law.
  The Tribunal is unable to initiate cases itself; 
instead, it must rely on the prosecutorial body called the Fiscalía. 
105  Its goal is to defend the public interest by ensuring a 
competitive market.106
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 WINSLOW, supra note 70, at 26. 
  In that capacity, members of the public  may report alleged violations 
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101 Decreto Ley No. 211 de 1973, Title II, Art. 5 (translated from Spanish by the author). 
102 Alexander Galetovic, Competition Policy in Chile, STANFORD CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 11 (July 2007). 
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of the competition law to the Fiscalía for further investigation in lieu of bringing suit before 
the Tribunal.107
 Procedurally, the Fiscalía is required to investigate all legally valid complaints 
presented to it.
   
108  While originally the Fiscalía initiatedthe majority of the investigations it 
conducted, complaints by individuals to the agency now comprise the majority of its caseload 
and investigations.109  The results of those investigations are presented to the Tribunal, along 
with a recommendation from the Fiscalía as to whether it recommends a formal charge.110
 Unfortunately, the Fiscalía does not help the Tribunal’s economic analysis, as the 
economic analysis put forth by the Fiscalía is often basic and of poor quality.
 
111  For 
example, in a case brought before the court in 1998, the Fiscalía filed suit against a gasoline 
distributor for instructing its franchisees to lower their prices, which allegedly constituted 
fixing prices below competitive levels.112  However, if the Fiscalía had analyzed the 
economic effect of the lower prices, rather than simply finding that lower prices were 
anticompetitive, it would have found that, because the distributor did have a dominant-firm 
position in the market and the price margins were high, fixing a profit-maximizing 
downstream price actually caused a societal gain, rather than a loss.113
 Regardless of the agency’s lack of economic finesse, the Fiscalía is active in the 
prosecution of anticompetitive behavior, which has helped to ensure that the current 
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competition law does not fall into disuse like Alessandri’s law in the 1950s.114
D. Return to Democracy in Chile 
  Thus, unlike 
the earlier Anti-Monopolies Commission, the Fiscalía and the Tribunal have both functioned 
to ensure the continued survival, relevance, and strength of the Law in Defense of Free 
Competition. 
 In 1988, a plebiscite led by the opposition parties obliged General Pinochet to hold 
free elections in Chile.115  In a smooth transition back to democracy, Patricio Aylwin was 
elected and assumed the presidency in 1990.116  During the presidential campaign, the 
Chicago Boys suggested that, unless carefully managed, a return to democracy in Chile could 
lead to the return of state controls on economic activity, a highly protected economy, or heavy 
state participation in economic production activities.117  Fortunately, the restoration of 
democracy in Chile has not caused a return to the state interventionism of the 1950s. 
However, to what degree the state’s role vis-à-vis the economy has changed is still the subject 
of debate.118
 One argument is that there is continuity between the economic and developmental 
policies of the dictatorship and the new democratic government; the other emphasizes 
differentiation between the social and economic goals of the two governments.
 
119
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  Because 
the democratic government has resisted and rejected socialism and populism of the variety 
that characterized the governments before the dictatorship, it is contended that there has been 
no substantive change to the country’s economic organization since the end of the 
115 VALDÉS,  supra note 6, at 254. 
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dictatorship.120  A fundamental characteristic of the Pinochet government was an indifference 
to the ethical, political, or social repercussions of the authoritarian approach to economic 
reorganization.  By contrast, the democratic approach is based on consensus, rather than 
authoritarian control, as well as attention to the social actors affected by economic 
legislation.121
 Such a consensus and movement away from heavy state participation has not 
remedied the economic ills that popularized the rise of socialism in the 1950s in Chile.  
Significantly, although the unequal distribution of wealth and income continues to plague the 
Chilean economy, the government maintains its strong commitment to a market-oriented 
economy while it tries to remedy the problem.
  Thus, the continuity of policy from the Pinochet government to the 
democratically elected government is not a commitment to the policies of the dictatorship, but 
rather a shift in popular opinion as to the best way to approach regulation of the economy. 
122
E. The Chilean Competition-Law Regime in Practice 
  The Chicago School’s acceptance in Chile 
was successful not because of the tight and brutal control with which Pinochet ruled the 
country, but instead was because of the flexibility in the approach of the application of the 
new economic policy that resulted in a viable development model and competition policy for 
Chile. 
 The violent time period during which Chile’s current competition law came into 
existence posed significant problems for the acceptance, legitimacy, and longevity of the legal 
regime.  For a law to be accepted and effective in a certain societal context, “it must be 
meaningful in the context in which it is to be applied so citizens have an incentive to use the 
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law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law.”123  If the process 
through which the competition regime had been transplanted had not carefully considered the 
demands of the Chilean context, the subsequent donor rejection could have seriously inhibited 
Chile’s ability to have and develop a workable competition law.124
 Since its enactment of the competition law in 1973, the Chilean legislature has 
developed the law and its accompanying institutions so that it is sufficiently flexible to 
address the needs of the society it serves.  The legal framework ensured that the judicial 
enforcement remained independent from the strong executive branch by separating the 
prosecutorial and judicial functions of the competition regime and by restraining the 
executive’s  ability to unilaterally manipulate the judiciary.
 Chile’s competition law 
has remained successful despite a return to democracy because the regime’s goals have taken 
into account the individualized needs of Chilean society and the law has addressed the 
important sectors of Chile’s economy. 
125  The Chilean President chooses 
the head of the Fiscalía, called the National Economic Prosecutor, while the Supreme Court 
and the Central Bank review Tribunal candidates, who are then elected after approval by the 
President.126  Both the Fiscalía and the Tribunal have made efforts to improve the 
transparency and accountability of their operations by increasing public access to information 
about procedural regulations and rulings.127
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  The Fiscalía has also made its economic 
124 James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of Chile, 29 
MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 511 (2008). 
125 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Committee, 2008 APEC Economic Policy 
Report, 74 (APEC 2008). 
126 Id. at 75. 
127 Id. at 75–76. 
	   23	  
analytical guidelines public to inform the nation of its methodology in the prosecution of 
alleged violations of the law.128
 In addition to the broad policy goals of the law, the competition law in Chile has 
proved successful because of its attention to and flexibility towards the most important sectors 
of the Chilean economy while enforcing the specific prohibitions against anti-competitive 
behavior.  Before the current law, the telecommunications industry was state-owned in Chile 
and was privatized in the 1980s.
 
129  Once privatized, the Spanish telecommunications giant 
Telefónica acquired a significant percentage of the telecommunications systems in Chile.130  
When these holdings were challenged as violative of the competition law, the court held that 
Telefónica had to sell a large part of its interest in the industry.131
 Similarly, the electricity sector was publicly owned before the enactment of the 
competition law.
  This would ensure that 
Telefónica could realize gains on its investment, thus ensuring that other companies would not 
be disincentivized from investing in the industry in Chile, while also protecting against 
market dominance by a single firm. 
132  Upon privatization, the industry was not divided, either horizontally or 
vertically, but rather, was sold as an already-dominant interest.133  Since then, non-dominant 
firms have brought suit, and the Tribunal has had to approach the dissolution of the dominant 
position flexibly to ensure that a competitive market was established equitably.134
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approach has created a market in which over 100 firms now compete to provide electricity to 
Chile.135
 Interestingly, Chile’s national constitution posed a unique problem in the privatization 
process of Chile’s mining industry: the document asserts that the state is the sole owner of all 
mines, regardless of who owns the surface land.
 
136  Once the government decided to privatize 
the industry, Chile needed to be able to foster competition without violating the language of 
its constitution.  To that end, Chile maintains direct ownership of the mines through state-
owned companies, but has established a system of concessions that provides mining rights to 
numerous firms.137  Even with continued state-ownership of the mines themselves, the 
security that the mining rights provide has enticed both domestic and foreign firms to invest in 
not only the exploration but also the exploitation of Chile’s mines.138
 While the Chilean competition-law regime is not a perfect system,
  Through a flexible 
approach to the application of its competition law, Chile was able to develop and maintain a 
lucrative mining industry without violating or amending either its constitution or the 
competition law. 
139
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 on the whole the 
introduction of competition law and policy in Chile should be considered a success.  During 
its creation by the Chicago Boys and in its subsequent development by the Chilean 
competition authorities, the application of the law has been flexible and meaningful for the 
Chilean society it serves.  Had the process merely transplanted American antitrust laws and 
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policy without regard for the individualized concerns of the Chilean context, there could have 
been significant over-regulation of competition activities.140  The individualized approach of 
the current competition regime saved the competition law in Chile because “[j]urisdictions 
would adopt different antitrust rules even if they all agreed on the economic principles 
governing rules and adopted the same goal.”141  The introduction of a competition regime and 
the subsequent cases that developed from it in Chile demonstrate that “a well-designed 
strategy for institution building should take into account ‘local knowledge’ and should not 
‘over-emphasize best-practice “blueprints”’ observed in developed countries at the expense of 
local participation and experimentation.142
 
  Because the competition authorities were able to 
assess and respond to the local needs and experiences of Chile, the translation of the 
competition policy was successful. 
 
 
PART II: THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLATATION OF COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY 
 
 As illustrated by the Chilean experience, the transplantation of competition policy is 
not accomplished by extracting successful competition laws from one jurisdiction and 
implanting them in another.  Instead, it requires sensitivity to the local context into which the 
competition policy is to be transplanted.  An effective introduction of competent competition 
laws should be flexible and consider the needs and realities of the recipient jurisdiction.   
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 The success of Chilean competition policy is due to the cooperative approach that the 
Chicago School economists took in introducing the laws as a manner of policing or refereeing 
the newly competitive markets.  Their approach did not force acceptance of American 
competition laws or simply transcribe the Sherman and Clayton Acts into the Chilean code.  
Instead, the economists partnered with local economists at the Universidad Católica and 
worked with them to develop approaches to curtail anticompetitive behavior.  This ensured 
that, when competition laws were introduced, they would not have an imperial character to 
them; rather, they would be responsive to the Chilean experience.   
In this way, the American economists took the seeds of American antitrust policy and 
transplanted them into the Chilean context so that their application and development would be 
meaningful and effective.  Such an approach recognizes the similarity of the broad aims of 
competition laws – to ensure competitive markets – while simultaneously accounting for local 
objectives.  By pairing with a local university, the Chicago School economists also invested 
local academics in the success of the competition law, incentivizing their cooperation in the 
creation of a competitive market economy in Chile.  
 As there is now a globalized economy, there is also a need to develop competition 
laws in developing economies around the world to ensure efficient international trade.143
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  As 
Chile’s history demonstrates, there are often challenges to establishing a competent and 
workable competition regime in an economy that has not previously needed or desired such 
laws.  While competition issues tend to be generally domestic in nature, anticompetitive 
behavior with either international or multi-jurisdictional effects has become increasingly 
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prevalent.144
 Developing economies are often unable to effectively enforce competition laws and 
“cannot create a credible threat to enforce their laws against large, multinational firms that 
engage in anticompetitive conduct that harms their economy.”
  As such, it is advantageous to develop legal regimes that have the ability to 
recognize and remedy anticompetitive behavior. 
145
 For many developing economies, such ability and resolve do not exist.  Because 
anticompetitive behavior is expected to be enforced unilaterally by the jurisdiction in which 
its effects are felt, developing economies often lack the resources for effective prosecution.
  Part of the failure of the 
competition law introduced by Jorge Alessandri’s government in Chile was the fact that the 
administrative bodies charged with enforcement were unable or unwilling to do so.  By 
contrast, Pinochet’s government and the subsequent democratic governments had both the 
political ability and the necessary resolve to enforce the competition law of 1973.   
146  
Moreover, when the effects of the anticompetitive behavior are felt in a developing 
jurisdiction outside of the one in which the anticompetitive activity takes place, there are even 
more significant barriers to enforcement of competition laws without inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation.147  There is often a combination of an inadequate ability to threaten prosecution 
of violations of competition laws and limited resources with which to combat such 
anticompetitive conduct.148
A solution to these enforcement barriers is a flexible approach in the implementation 
of competition regimes in developing economies.  In Chile, the Chicago School economists 
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recognized that a one-size-fits-all style competition law that was entirely based on American 
antitrust statutes was impossible if the law was to be long lasting and effective.  Instead, 
unlike the earlier attempt at regulating anticompetitive behavior, the new competition law 
addressed the societal concern that the state had become too great a participant in the market.  
The new competition law in Chile was successful in part because it took into account the 
history of the locality in which the law was to have effect.   
Currently, there is discussion about the possibility of convergence among the various 
competition laws around the world and a movement toward a globalized competition policy.  
Convergence of competition policies attempts to align competition-law systems with each 
other.149
CONCLUSION 
  In contrast to the idea of flexible transplantation of competition laws based upon the 
unique experiences and needs of the recipient jurisdiction, if not done carefully, convergence 
could force the adoption of competition laws that ignore those unique concerns.  Because, as 
in the Chilean experience, competition policy has a greater chance for survival if the laws 
enacted address the individual challenges present.  It is necessary for the convergence 
movement to carefully implement laws that permit flexibility in their application based upon 
unique historical contexts. Provided that, as in Chile, the development of those policies 
seriously considers not only what worked well in the exporting jurisdiction, but also the 
individual, specific concerns of the importing nation, the convergence between competition-
law systems and the international transplantation of competition regimes has the potential to 
promote the efficiency and equity benefits of competent competition policy worldwide. 
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 The competition law in Chile as it exists today, as well as the history that produced the 
law, provides both a model and a cautionary tale for jurisdictions that seek to establish their 
own competition regimes.  Chile’s tumultuous history during the past half-century produced a 
competition law that is unique in its development and its success.  While it came about under 
the authoritarian control of a dictatorship, it was the flexibility with which its founders drafted 
the law and the commitment to its preservation by subsequent democratic governments that 
ensured the longevity and importance of Chile’s competition law.  The law has adhered to the 
economic principles that its drafters espoused, but has also managed to respond to the needs 
of the public that the law protected.  Thus, if another country is to look at the Chilean 
experience as illustrative or instructive, it must do so with the historical context and practical 
concerns that fostered the development of the law.  It is not merely the law itself that made the 
Law in Defense of Free Competition a success in Chile; instead, the law owes its success to 
its flexibility, individualized implementation, and contextualized specificity. 
